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Article 6

THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN PERSPECTIVE
G. Alan Tarr*
I.

INTRODUCTION

According to a nineteenth century journalist, things were so quiet
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court that you could hear the justices' arteries clog.' Whether or not this depiction of the Wisconsin court
(which I owe to a current member of the court, Chief'Justice Shirley
Abrahamson) was accurate then, it certainly does not describe the
contemporary Wisconsin Supreme Court-or any other present-day
state supreme court. 2 Things are not as they were, and the new judicial federalism-the increased reliance by state judges on state declarations of rights to secure rights unavailable under the United States
Constitution-is one of the main reasons for the change. 3
The new judicial federalism emerged during the early 1970s, following the appointment of Chief Justice Warren Burger to succeed
Earl Warren on the U.S. Supreme Court, and was encouraged byjustice William Brennan, a stalwart of the Warren Court. 4 Thus, when
* Professor of Political Science and Director, Council for State Constitutional
Studies, Rutgers University-Camden. BA. College of the Holy Cross 1968; MA.
University of Chicago 1970; Ph.D. (Political Science) University of Chicago 1976. An
earlier version of this article was published as The Past and Future of the New Judicial
FederaliUm, PuBLrus:J. FEDERALISM, Spring 1994, at 63. Reprinted with permission; all
rights reserved. The author acknowledges the generous research support of the
National Endowment for the Humanities.
1 Shirley S. Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice: The State Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 315 (Bradley McGraw ed., 1985).

2

For an overview of contemporary state supreme courts, see G. ALAN TARR &

MARY CORNELIA ALDIs PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988).

3 The literature documenting the new judicial federalism is vast. The development of the newjudicial federalism is surveyed in Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1324 (1982); New Developments in
State ConstitutionalLaw, PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1987; HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE

STATES (Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988); and in the annual issues on state constitutional law in Rutgers Law Journal(1989-1996).
4 On the connection between the advent of the Burger Court and the emergence of the new judicial federalism, see Earl M. Malta, The PoliticalDynamism of the
"NewJudicialFederalism",2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 233 (1989). For Justice
Brennan's encouragement of the new judicial federalism, see WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr.,
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state supreme courts began to rely on their state constitutions, critics
charged that they were merely attempting to evade Burger Court rulings and safeguard the civil libertarian gains of the Warren Court.5
This criticism lost force, however, as the new judicial federalism
spread, and the supreme courts of almost every state announced rulings based on the rights guarantees of their state constitutions. 6 Now,
when a state supreme court invokes the rights guarantees of its state
constitution, it is hardly newsworthy. In fact, some state supreme
courts have even indicated that they would address state constitutional
claims first and consider federal constitutional claims only when cases
could not be resolved on state grounds.7 By the late 1990s, then, the
new judicial federalism has become an established feature of American federalism.
The development of the new judicial federalism raises intriguing
questions about the role played by state supreme courts and state constitutions in safeguarding rights and-more generally-about the
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489-503
(1977); and William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
5 For criticisms from the bench, see, for example, Peoplev. Ramey, 545 P.2d 1333,
1341 (Cal. 1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); Peoplev. Disbrow 545 P.2d 272, 282 (Cal. 1976)
(Richardson, J., dissenting); People v. Norman, 538 P.2d 237, 245 (Cal. 1975) (Clark, J.,
dissenting). For criticism in legal publications, see, for example: George Deukmeijian
& Clifford K. Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-JudicialReview Under the California
Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1979); and Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the
Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972). Certainly there was some basis
for this complaint. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972). Moreover,
some proponents of the new judicial federalism encouraged frankly evasive rulings.
See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalismin CriminalProcedure:State CourtEvasion of
the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974). Thus, other proponents of the new judicial
federalism worried about "reactive" rulings that cast an aura of illegitimacy over serious efforts to interpret state declarations of rights. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Awayfrom a ReactionaryApproach, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1
(1981); Mary Cornelia Porter, State Supreme Courts and the Legacy of the Warren Court:
Some Old Inquiriesfor a New Situation, in STATE SueREME CouRTs: PouCYMAKERS IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982).
6 On the spread of the new judicial federalism, see Ronald K.L. Collins et al.,
State High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, PUBLrUS:J. FEDERALISM, Summer 1986, at 141. See also the annual surveys
of developments of state constitutional law in Rutgers Law Journal.
7 These states include Maine-see, for example, State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148
(Me. 1984); Oregon--see, for example, Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Or. 1981);
Vermont--see, for example, State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336 (Vt. 1982); and Washington--see, for example, State v. Coe, 679 P.2d 353 (Wash. 1984). This approach was
championed by Justice Hans E. Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court. See Hans E.
Linde, Without "DueProcess": UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125 (1970).
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character of contemporary American federalism. Does the new judicial federalism represent a return to an earlier federalism, or is it
something new? Insofar as the new judicial federalism represents an
innovation in constitutional law, why did state courts "discover" state
constitutional guarantees only recently? How great a shift in responsibility for protecting rights has the new judicial federalism produced?
Is it merely a response to a particular set of circumstances, or does it
signify a fundamental shift in responsibility for protecting rights?
Now that the new judicial federalism is no longer new, we are in a
better position to answer these questions, and they provide the focus
for this Article.
I.

A.

THE NoT-So-NEw JUDIcIAL FEDERAuSM?

The Standard Account: Three Eras of Rights Protection

The standard account of the newjudicial federalism suggests that
it is not really novel but rather involves a "rediscovery" of state constitutions and state declarations of rights. According to this account, the
history of rights protection in United States falls into three distinct
eras.8 During the first era, which lasted roughly 140 years, state constitutions were necessarily the primary vehicle for protecting individual
rights. Until the 1930s state governments were far more involved than
the federal government in domestic policy; as a result, civil liberties
litigation usually involved challenges to the actions of state governments. The federal Constitution offered few protections against state
violations of rights because prior to incorporation, the U.S. Bill of
Rights only restricted the federal government. 9 For protection against
most state infringements on rights, therefore, claimants had to turn to
state declarations of rights. This conjunction of more frequent state
opportunities to invade rights and the absence of federal remedies for
8

For an account of the three eras focusing on criminal justice, see Shirley S.

Abrahamson, CriminalLaw and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional

Law, 63 TEx. L. Ruv. 1141 (1985). For extension of this notion to civil liberties more
generally, see Shirley S. Abrahamson & Diane S. Gutmann, The New JudicialFederalism:
State Constitutions and State Courts, 71 JUDICATURE 88 (1987); and Shirley S. Abrahamson, Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union, 18 HASTINGS CONST.

L.Q. 723 (1991). The assumption of the three eras underlies much of the writing
about the new judicial federalism. For my own ill-considered endorsement of the
notion, see G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutionalismand "FirstAmendment"Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE STATES, supra note 3, at 38-39.
9 Federal constitutional limitations on the states included a ban on bills of attain-

der and ex post facto laws, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and a requirement that
citizens of each state be accorded the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states, U.S. CONSr.art. IV,§ 2, cl. 1.
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such invasions ensured (according to the standard account) that state
courts and state law dominated the protection of rights during the
first era.
During the second era, beginning in the 1930s and continuing
into the 1970s, the federal government (and particularly the federal
courts) assumed primary-indeed, almost exclusive-responsibility
for protecting rights. This shift coincided with the expansion of the
federal government's involvement in domestic policy, which increased
the potential for federal violations of constitutional rights and for litigation in federal courts to vindicate those rights. Even more important were the gradual incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights and
the increased activism of federal courts in civil liberties cases. Once
the U.S. Supreme Court pioneered in developing a civil liberties jurisprudence during the 1920s and 1930s, the Court's activism attracted
litigants who either brought their claims in federal court or, if that was
impossible, based their claims in state court on federal constitutional
law. Likewise important to civil liberties litigants were various procedural advantages, such as the familiarity of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which encouraged them to file their claims in federal
court. The arguments of litigants, together with the ease of relying on
readily available federal precedent, encouraged state judges to ignore
their declarations of rights and base their civil liberties rulings on federal guarantees. As a result, according to the standard account, civil
liberties law during the second era became almost exclusively federal
law.
According to the standard account, the third era, the era of the
new judicial federalism, blends elements of the first and second eras.
It resembles its immediate predecessor in that federal civil liberties
law continues to predominate. However, it also harkens back to the
first era, in that state supreme courts are interpreting state declarations of rights as independent sources of rights. Given this asserted
continuity with the first era, state judges who base their rulings on
state guarantees are not inaugurating a jurisprudential revolution;
they are merely recovering a neglected tradition in state constitutional
law.
B.

Inventing the Past

The standard account of the judicial protection of rights-and
particularly its description of the "first era"-does have a surface
plausability. Until the 1930s state governments did have more opportunities to invade rights than did the federal government, given the
limited scope of federal activity; and prior to incorporation, federal
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remedies for state invasions of rights were often unavailable. Moreover, one may well sympathize with the concern that underlies this
account It is far easier to legitimize state judicial rulings expanding
civil liberties if one can give them an historical pedigree, if one can
portray them as nothing more than the recovery of a tradition. But
unfortunately for proponents of the new judicial federalism, the standard account of the first era is more edifying than accurate: the new
judicial federalism is indeed new. Although the conditions may have
seemed ripe for the development of state civil liberties law in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, no such development occurred.
In fact, until the advent of the new judicial federalism, state courts'
contributions to developing constitutional protections for civil liberties were minimal. An examination of the issues addressed by state
supreme courts during the first era and their rulings on important
civil liberties issues-such as religious liberty, freedom of speech, and
the rights of criminal defendants-confirms this assessment.
1. The Business of State Supreme Courts
Although evidence is fragmentary, historical studies of the business of state supreme courts reveal that these courts were not heavily
involved in protecting civil liberties during the first era.' 0 During the
antebellum period, constitutional litigation in general was relatively
rare in state supreme courts. In fact, when the New York Court of
Appeals, locked in a dispute with the legislature, invalidated fifty-two
statutes from 1840-1860, this was "probably [more] than in all the
other states of the Union combined."" According to one account,
fewer than forty state laws we're invalidated in Southern supreme
courts from 1776-1861. Although over half these statutes were held
to violate some provision of a state bill of rights, "they scarcely
touched fundamental matters such as freedom of speech, freedom of
the press, freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly."' 2 Accounts
of judicial review in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
offer a similar picture. On the basis of a sampling of rulings of sixteen
state high courts over a hundred-year period, Robert Kagan and his
associates concluded that during the late nineteenth and early twenti10 Important surveys of cases decided by state supreme courts are Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970,30 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1977)
[hereinafter Kagan, Business]; and Robert A. Kagan et al., The Evolution of State Supreme
Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 961 (1978).
11 Edward S. Corwin, The Extension ofJudicialReview in New York: 1783-1905, 15
MICH. L. RPv. 281, 303 (1917).
12 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, CONsTrnIONS AND CONST1TUTIONALISM IN THE SLAVEHOLDING SOUTH 22 (1989).
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eth centuries, property and business cases dominated the agendas of
state supreme courts. Most of these cases involved "ordinary commercial disputes-disputes over title to real estate, foreclosure of mortgages, creditors' rights against defaulting debtors and failed
businesses.'1 3 Public law cases accounted for only twelve percent of all
cases, and they primarily involved issues of land use (e.g., zoning, eminent domain, and condemnation) and taxation. What state constitutional litigation there was typically involved provisions unique to state
constitutions and focused on issues such as taxes and revenues and
the structure and powers of local governments, rather than on civil
liberties.' 4 Indeed, Kagan concluded that throughout the period of
their research, "free speech and race discrimination cases have been
rare." 15 State high courts did hear a sizable number of appeals in
criminal cases-roughly eleven percent of all their cases from 1870 to
1935-but less than one-fifth of these cases raised constitutional issues.' 6 Not until the transformation of criminal justice by the Warren
Court did state supreme courts experience a significant increase in
criminal cases raising constitutional issues.
2.

Religious Liberty

Most state constitutions from the very outset contained guarantees of religious liberty. 17 In addition, many states during the first era
added more stringent and detailed requirements for a separation of
church and state, such as bans on state support for sectarian activities
or for places of worship, than are found in the First Amendment.' 8
13 See Kagan, Business, supra note 10, at 133.
14 James Willard Hurst has argued that the greater detail and specificity of latenineteenth-century state constitutions "worked to increase the power of the judges, by
giving them broader scope for their interpretation and application of the fundamental law." JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERIcAN LAW 228 (1950). However, this greater detail and specificity seldom involved state declarations of rights.
Rather, it typically was found in provisions concerned with the regulation of corporations, the governing of municipalities, and restrictions on the legislature's power to
enact private law. See CHARLES CHAUNCEY BINNEY, RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL LEGISLATION IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1894).
15 Kagan, Business, supra note 10, at 150.
16 Id. at 133 tbl.1, 147.
17 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights § 3; DEL. CONST. art. 29; NJ.

CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII;

VA. CONST.

of 1776, art. I, § 16 (Declaration of Rights).

For an overview of these provisions and their development prior to the adoption of

the federal Constitution, see

THOMAS J. CURRY,

THE

FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND

chs. 6-7 (1986).
18 For a discussion of these provisions, see G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the
States, 64 WASH. L. REV. 73 (1989).
STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
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Moreover, religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics flared
in many states during the nineteenth century, affording the occasion
for religious liberty litigation. 19 Yet, not much litigation resulted from
this or from other religious controversies. Instead, states tended to
resolve religious disputes by political action, constitutional amendment, or statute. For example, in response to efforts by Catholics to
secure public support for their schools, several states during the latter
half of the nineteenth century adopted amendments prohibiting the
use of state funds to support sectarian schools.2 0 Earlier in the century, several states had enacted statutes or ratified amendments that
superseded the common law and permitted atheists to serves as wit2
nesses and as jurors. 1
The sole exception to this pattern of resolving religious issues
through amendment or statute involved Bible reading in public
schools. While a few states expressly authorized the practice in their
constitutions, most did not, and during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, fifteen state supreme courts were called upon to rule
on its constitutionality. 22 Yet even these cases did not provide the
foundation for a state constitutional law of religious liberty. Most state
judges upheld Bible reading with scant analysis of the principles underlying the relevant state guarantees. For example, some judges contended that the Bible was not a sectarian book, even if the version
favored by a particular denomination was utilized exclusively.2 3
Others simply asserted that the daily reading of Scripture passages- did
not transform the school into a place of worship in violation of consti19

Useful accounts of these conflicts include: ROY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTES1800-1860 (1938); Lo PlEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1967);
JOHN WEBB PRArr, RELIGION, POLTCS, AND DIWERsIr. THE CHURCH-STATE THEME IN
NEW YORK STATE HISTORY (1967); and ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN
THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1964).
20 ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. 12, § 8; ARm. CONST. of 1869, art. 9, § 1; CAL. CONST.
of 1879, art. 9, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. 9, §§ 7, 8; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 3; KAN. CONST.
of 1855, art. 7, § 2; MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XVIII (amended 1855); MINN. CONST.
art. 8, § 3; N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. IX; N.D. CONST. art. 8, §§ 1, 5; OHIO CONST. art.
VI, § 2; OR. CONST. art. 1, § 5; PA. CONST. of 1874, art. X, § 2; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11
(1889, amended 1957); Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 19.
TANT CRUSADE,

21 See CHESTERJAMES ANTIEAU ET AL., RELIGION UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS, chs.
2, 5 (1965); WnjLAm GEORGE TORPEY, JUDICIAL DocrRiNEs OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN
AMERICA, chs. 9-10 (1948).

22

For an example of a provision authorizing Bible reading in the schools, see

MISs. CONST. of 1890, art. 3, § 18. The early cases in which Bible reading was chal-

lenged are collected and discussed in Tarr, supra note 18, at 100-03.
23 See, e.g., Hackett v. Brooksville, 87 S.W. 792 (Ky. 1905); Donahue v. Richards,
38 Me. 399 (1854).
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tutional strictures.2 4 Although judges in five states struck down Bible
reading in the schools, their rulings neither persuaded their colleagues in other states nor promoted the development of a body of
religious liberty law.
3.

Freedom of Speech

From the very outset, state declarations of rights contained ringing endorsements of freedom of speech and of the press, though several also warned that those who abused these freedoms would be held
responsible for the abuse.2 5 During the latter half of the nineteenth
century, various commentators-among them, Thomas Cooley, Frederick Grimke, and Theodore Schroeder-explored the meaning of
these freedoms, insisting that democratic government required a libertarian reading of the constitutional guarantees.2 6 However, neither
the constitutional protections nor the commentators' libertarian theory of free speech had much effect on constitutional litigation during
the first era. State courts heard few speech or press cases, and-in the
words of a leading expert on the subject-"the overwhelming majority
of [pre-World War I] decisions in all jurisdictions rejected free speech
27
claims, often by ignoring their existence."
During the first era, questions of speech or press freedom were,
for the most part, resolved without litigation. Libel is a case in point.
During the earliest years of the Republic, libel prosecutions and civil
actions for libel by political leaders were fairly common, although
courts rarely viewed them as implicating constitutional guarantees of
24 See, e.g., People ex reL Vollmar v. Stanley, 255 P. 610 (Colo. 1927); Pfeiffer v.
Board of Educ., 77 N.W. 250 (Mich. 1898); Church v. Bullock, 109 S.W. 115 (Tex.

1908).
25

These provisions are collected in Ronald ILL. Collins, Bills and Declarationsof

Rights Digest, in THE AMERICAN

BENCH

2483, 2483-523 (3d ed. 1985/86). For perti-

nent discussions, see Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as ConstitutionalProvisons, in LIBERTY
AND COMMUNITY. CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1987); and DONALD LUTz, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL: WHIG POLITICAL THEORY IN THE

(1980).
26 For a discussion of their arguments, see NORMAN L.

EARLY STATE CONSTITUTIONS

ROSENBERG, PROTECTING
THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL, ch. 7 (1986); AlexisJ.

Anderson, The Formative Period ofFirst Amendment Theory, 1870-1915, 24 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 56 (1980); Margaret A. Blanchard, Filling in the Void: Speech and Press in State
Courts Prior to Gitlow, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED (Bill F. Chamberlin &
CharleneJ. Brown eds. 1982); and David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU,
and ChangingConceptions ofFree Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REv. 47 (1992).
27 David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514

(1981).
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free speech.2 8 From the Jacksonian era to the end of the nineteenth
century, however, such libel actions virtually ceased. For one thing,
"[elnjoying easy access to party or factional newspapers, political leaders could quickly meet opposition slander with denials, countercharges, or libels of their own." 29

For another thing, politicians

recognized that libel actions conflicted with their vested interest in an
unrestricted party press. Thus, changes in political practice rather
than constitutional rulings protected the press.
Perhaps the most important free speech issue of the antebellum
era involved the rights of abolitionists. Yet this issue too was resolved
without litigation in state supreme courts.3 0 In the South, not surprisingly, legislative bans on abolitionist publications and the circulation
of abolitionist materials went unchallenged. In the North, legislatures
refused to restrict press freedom, although at times local mobs prevented abolitionists from publishing.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the most
contentious free speech issue was the rights of political radicals. 3 ' In
most cases, state judges rejected the radicals' free speech claims,
either applying a version of the "bad tendency" test or-in the case of
municipalities' refusal to grant permits for peaceful marches or demonstrations-recognizing virtually unlimited government control over
the use of public property. Almost none of these rulings were based
on a sustained analysis of free speech rights. Even the few cases in
which judges ruled in favor of rights claimants, however, did not signal the beginnings of state constitutional jurisprudence. As David
Rabban has put it, "the few relatively libertarian opinions were not
analytically more rigorous than the norm for this period."3 2 In summary, when the U.S. Supreme Court addressed free speech in the
early twentieth century, there was no body of state court free speech
law on which it could draw in developing its jurisprudence.
4.

Criminal Justice

The most frequent civil liberties cases coming before state
supreme courts, at least during the latter half of the nineteenth century, involved appeals by criminal defendants who claimed that their
28 This account of libel actions during the nineteenth century relies on ROSENsupra note 26.
29 Id. at 143.
30 This account relies on RUSSEL BLAINE NYE, FETERED FREEDOM: COnr LiBERTIES
AND THE SLAVERY CoNTRovERSY, 1830-1860 (1963).
31 The analysis in this paragraph relies on Rabban, supra note 27, and on Anderson, supra note 26.
32 Rabban, supra note 27, at 558.
BERG,
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convictions involved a violation of constitutional rights. A few of these
cases led to landmark rulings.3 3 For the most part, however, these
appeals differed significantly from modem criminal justice litigation. 34 Few involved major challenges to the system of criminal jus-

tice. The vast majority involved much narrower concerns, such as
whether the particular facts of the case brought the defendant within
some existing legal rule. While obviously of interest to the defendants, these cases thus required no transformations of constitutional
law for their resolution, nor did state courts seize on opportunities to
develop state civil liberties law. Indeed, as Lawrence Friedman has
noted, "in most of the cases, constitutional points seem raised almost
as an afterthought and rejected cavalierly, almost with a yawn." 35
In sum, our survey of state judicial rulings during the first era
reveals that state supreme courts did not develop a body of civil liberties law prior to the 1930s. The new judicial federalism thus represents not a return to the past but an unprecedented exercise of state
judicial power.
III.

THE

NEw JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

If state court interpretations of state constitutions did not play an
important role in protecting rights prior to the new judicial federalism, the obvious question is why. This question, in turn, points to a
broader issue, namely, the role that state supreme courts have played
historically in state constitutional development. During the 1950s and
1960s, scholars investigated this issue in the course of analyzing state
constitutional change. In the wake of the new judicial federalism,
their explanations of why state judges had proved less aggressive than
their federal counterparts in initiating constitutional change are not
altogether persuasive. Nonetheless, examination of these explanations sheds further light on the new judicial federalism and illuminates how interactions between state and federal courts have
influenced state constitutional development.
33

See, e.g., State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903); Carpenter v. Dane, 9 Wis.

249 (1859).
34 For a more detailed presentation of the argument of this paragraph, see Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions and CriminalJustice in the Nineteenth Century, in
TOWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS (Paul Finkleman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991).
35 Id. at 274. Loren Beth has also concluded that the state cases on fair trial
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were too "scattered" to suggest any trends. LOREN
1877-1917 (1971).

P. BETH,

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERicAN CONSTrTUTION,
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ConstitutionalProvisions

One explanation offered for the limited role played by state
supreme courts in state constitutional change is that the greater specificity of state constitutional provisions leaves little room for judicial
interpretation. 36 This argument, however, is unpersuasive. Undoubtedly, many state constitutional provisions are so clear and detailed
that they generate no litigation.3 7 Yet the same thing can be said
about many provisions of the Federal Constitution: for example, there
is no controversy over the mode of representation in the Senate or
over the President's power to appoint ambassadors. In addition, in
contrast with the Federal Constitution, state constitutions contain numerous policy provisions-for example, guarantees of a "thorough
and efficient education," requirements of environmental quality, and
the like-that seem to invite litigation.3 8 Moreover, the presence of
"statutory" material in state constitutions does not preclude state
courts from playing an important role in governance. They can construe restrictive provisions in a way that promotes legislative discretion
in dealing with problems. For example, the New York Court of Appeals has interpreted various limitations .on local finances in such a
way as to drastically reduce or altogether eliminate their effect.3 9 Alternatively, state courts can hamstring state legislatures through punctilious assertions of constitutional requirements. Finally, it should be
noted that the federal provisions which have generated the most litigation in recent years-the First Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and protections of defendants'
rights-all have analogues in state constitutions. The relative absence
36 See, e.g., ELMER E. CORNWELL, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THm PoLITICS OF THE REVISION PROCESS IN SEVEN STATES 8 (1975). According toJohn Orth, this
explained the infrequency ofjudicial interpretation of North Carolina's 1776 consti-

tution.

JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION:

A

REFERENCE

GUIDE 7 (1993).

37 See G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMPLE L. REV. 1169,
1181-83 (1992).
38 On school finance, see, for example, NJ. CONST. art. 8, § 4, 1; on environmental quality, see MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 52. For overviews of these constitutional
commitments, see A.E. Dick Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L.
REV. 193 (1972); and Symposium: Investingin Our Children'sFuture: School FinanceReform
in the 90's, 28 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 293 (1991). The fact that these provisions seem to
invite litigation may reflect the contemporary legal culture rather than something
intrinsic to the provisions.

39 PETER J. GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
184-98 (1991). For the judicial evisceration of procedural requirements for state legislation, see Robert F. Williams, State ConstitutionalLimits on Legislative Procedure:Legislative Compliance andJudicialEnforcement PUBUS: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1987, at 91.
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of civil libertarian activism by state judges, therefore cannot be attributed primarily to the substance of state constitutions.
B. JudicialRestraint
Some commentators have suggested that the relative passivity of
state supreme courts reflects a tradition of judicial restraint in the
states. 40 It is easy to collect quotations from state judges eschewing a
policy role for their courts or to infer an attachment to judicial restraint from the absence of innovative constitutional rulings. 41 However, over time state supreme courts have contributed in important
ways to the governance of their states. For example, during the early
nineteenth century, the era of what Karl Llewellyn has called "the
American grand style," state judges "Americanized" the common law
by eliminating elements inconsistent with the republican character of
the American regime. 42 They also substantially revised standards of
liability to encourage the growth of commercial enterprise. 43 During
the 1960s and 1970s, state judges initiated a revolution in tort law
designed to afford greater redress for plaintiffs.4 During the 1980s, it
has been argued, they quietly staged a tort law counterrevolution. 45
These initiatives reveal that state courts have not consistently recognized judicial restraint as a requirement, at least in the sphere of private law.
Insofar as there is a tradition of judicial restraint in the states,
therefore, it must be limited to constitutional law. Yet, even in the
constitutional realm, there is reason to distrust judicial restraint as an
40 See, e.g., Ernest R. Bartley, Methods of ConstitutionalChange in MAJOR PROBLEMS
IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 21, 22-24 (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960).
41 HENRY ROBERT GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE PoLrrics: AN INVESTIGATION
OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE (1971); Wold, PoliticalOrientations, Social Backgrounds, and Role
Perceptions of State Supreme CourtJudges, 27 W. POL. Q. 239 (1974).
42 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 62
(1960). On changes in state judges' orientation toward common-law policymaking,
see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977). On the substantive changes
in the common law, see WILLIAM EDWARD NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON
LAW (1975).
43 MORTON J. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860
(1977).
44 For overviews, see ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING To Do JUSTICE: REFORMING
PRIVATE LAW (1969); Baum & Canon, State Supreme Courts as Activists: New Doctrines in
the Law of Torts, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMARRS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
(Mary Cornelia Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982); TARR & PORTER, supra note 2, at
34-40.
45 James A. Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An EmpiricalExamination of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990).
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explanation. For one thing, the argument for such a tradition seems
curiously circular. State courts have not initiated constitutional
change, it is argued, because of a tradition of judicial restraint. Yet,
the sole evidence for that tradition is the absence of court-initiated
change. For another thing, historical evidence reveals that state
courts have not consistently embraced judicial restraint in their constitutional pronouncements.
Even before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Marbury v. Madison
in 1803, state supreme courts asserted their authority to invalidate legislative enactments. 46 Furthermore, as Suzanna Sherry has shown,
early in the nation's history, state courts showed little reluctance in
relying on extratextualjustifications in invalidating state laws. 4 7 In the
period after the Civil War, state supreme courts were increasingly willing to determine election controversies, issue injunctions, and otherwise iftervene in day-to-day governance. 4 8 They also were more
willing to invalidate state laws 'as violations of equal protection or substantive due process.4 9 Indeed, when the U.S. Supreme Court began
to invalidate state economic regulations on due process grounds, it
was merely "nationalizing a constitutional ideology averse to special
government burdens or benefits" that had been pioneered in the
states.5 0 Even after the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the responsi46 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). On the pre-Marbury recognition ofjudicial review, see H. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State ConstitutionalHistory: A Case Note, in
ToWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONsTrrurIONS(Paul Finkleman & Stephen E. Gotflieb eds., 1991).
47 Suzanna Sherry, The Early Virginia Tradition of ExtratextualInterpretation, in ToWARD A USABLE PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONsTrrTrIONS(Paul Finkleman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991); and Suzanna Sherry, Foreword: State ConstitutionalLaw:
Doing the Right Thing, 25 RUTGERS LJ. 935 (1994). For studies of the exercise ofjudicial review by state courts in the early nineteenth century, see MARGARET VIRGINIA
NELSON, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw IN VIRGINIA, 1789-1928 (1947); and Corwin,
supra note 11.

48 MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE 358-70 (1977). Kermit Hall has also argued that the move from an appointive to an elective judiciary in the mid-nineteenth
century coincided with an increase in judicial activism. Kermit Hall, TheJudiciary on
Trial:State ConstitutionalReform and the Rise of an ElectedJudiciary, 1846-1860,44 ISTO-

337 (1983).
49 The New York Court of Appeals invalidated almost three hundred statutes
from 1865-1900, as compared to sixty-five in the antebellum era. See Corwin, supra
note 11, at 283-85. The SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts invalidated only ten
laws prior to 1860 but struck down thirty-one from 1860-1893. The Virginia Supreme
Court invalidated roughly one-third of all challenged statutes in the late nineteenth
century. And the Ohio Supreme Court struck down fifty-seven statutes from
1880-1900. These data are drawn from KELLER, supra note 48, at 362.
RLaN

50 HOWARD GILLMAN, Tim

CONSTITUTION BESEIGED: THE RISE

NER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1993).
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bility, many state judges continued to supervise state regulation of economic activity. 5 1 Finally, the development of the new judicial
federalism itself casts doubt on the claim of a well-established tradition of judicial restraint. If state courts were committed to judicial
restraint in constitutional interpretation, why would some state courts
so readily go beyond the U.S. Supreme Court in protecting rights?
C. The American Judicial Tradition and American Federalism
A more fruitful approach to understanding why the new judicial
federalism emerged when it did is to view state constitutional interpretation as occurring in the context of-and being influenced by-a
broader American judicial tradition.5 2 In making this claim, we are
not denying differences among states or among historical eras.
Rather, we are suggesting that the standards of appropriate judicial
practice-best understood as prescribing a range of legitimate behavior rather than rigid rules governing judicial practice-change over
time. Statejudges, like their federal counterparts, participate in creating those standards and respond to them. Gradually, judges become
educated as to the prevailing standards; that is, they learn how to approach and interpret their state constitutions by watching how other
courts (both federal and state) interpret their own charters. 5 3 Litigants also ensure that appropriate claims and arguments, pioneered
in other judicial arenas, are brought before them. Thus, it was not
surprising that in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
state courts looked to extratextual sources in interpreting their state
constitutions; other courts were doing likewise. 54 Nor was it surprising
that in the late nineteenth century, state courts began to invalidate
legislation that trespassed on economic liberty; they had such a course
urged on them by influential legal treatises and authorized by the ex51

Peter J. Galie, State Courts and Economic Rights, 496 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. &

Soc. Sci. 76 (1988); Susan P. Fino, Remnants of the Past: Economic Due Process in the
States, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES, supra note 3, at 145.
52 For an overview of this tradition, which recognizes the contributions of state
judges to its development, see EDWARD G. WHITE, THE AMERCANJUDICIAL TRAIToN:
PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES (1976). For a thoughtful analysis that links
state and federal traditions, see Friedman, supra note 34.
53 These patterns of interaction between state and federal courts and among state
courts have been described as vertical judicial federalism and horizontal judicial federalism. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 2, ch. 1.
54 See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders'UnurittenConstitution,54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127
(1987); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles ofJudicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974).
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ample of sister courts. 55 Similarly, it was not surprising that, in the
1970s, state courts began to emulate the Warren Court in giving broad
reading to their states' rights guarantees.
This, in turn, helps explain why the new judicial federalism did
not develop until the 1970s. The existence of state constitutional
guarantees and the absence of federal involvement appeared to afford
an opportunity for judicial initiatives during the first era, but that was
not enough. What was missing was a model of how state judges could
develop a civil libertiesjurisprudence. Because Americans had not yet
come to rely on courts to vindicate civil liberties, state courts throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries gained little experience in interpreting civil liberties guarantees. Nor could they look to
federal courts for guidance in interpreting their constitutional protections. The federal courts also decided few civil liberties cases, and
their rulings typically revealed little sympathy for rights claimants. 5 6
Only when circumstances brought a combination of state constitutional arguments, plus an example of how a court might develop constitutional guarantees, could a state civil liberties jurisprudence
emerge. Put differently, when the Burger Court's anticipated-and to
some extent actual-retreat from Warren Court activism encouraged
civil liberties litigants to look elsewhere for redress, the experience of
the preceding decades had laid the foundation for the development
of state civil liberties law.
Paradoxically, then, the activism of the Warren Court, which has
often been portrayed as detrimental to federalism, was a necessary
condition for the emergence of vigorous state involvement in protecting civil liberties. From a somewhat different perspective, the protection of civil liberties in the United States should not be viewed as a
zero-sum game, in which increased activity by one judiciary necesitates
decreased activity by the other. Rather, the relationship between federal and state judiciaries involves a sharing of responsibility and a process of mutual learning, such that a change in orientation by one set
of courts is likely, over time, to be reflected in other courts.

55 See GILLMAN, supra note 50.
56 In free speech cases, "the Supreme Court, with one exception, uniformly
found against free speech claimants." See Rabban, supra note 27, at 520. Whether or
not correctly decided, the Supreme Court's religion rulings likewise reveal little sympathy for religious minorities. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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THE SCOPE AND IMPACT OF THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM

Writing in 1986, Justice William J. Brennan suggested that the
"[r] ediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions .

.

. is probably

the most important development in constitutional jurisprudence in
our time."57 Although many legal scholars have echoed Brennan's
sentiments, his assessment should probably not be taken as conclusive.
After all, Brennan was the intellectual godfather of the new judicial
federalism, and his disagreement with the conservative majority on
the U.S. Supreme Court gave him reason to encourage the development of state constitutional law.58 We therefore must consider the
actual impact of the new judicial federalism: how often litigants bring
state constitutional claims before state courts, how often those courts
base their rulings on state versus federal law, and to what extent their
reliance on state constitutions results in broader protections for rights
than are available under the federal Constitution.
A.

The Scope of the New JudicialFederalism

During the past twenty-five years, there has clearly been an upsurge in state courts' reliance on state declarations of rights in civil
liberties cases. Legal scholars have identified major initiatives by state
courts involving school finance, the rights of defendants, and the
right to privacy, among other matters. 59 Quantitative analyses likewise
confirm the greater attention to state guarantees. For example, Ronald Collins and Peter Galie found over three hundred cases from 1970
to 1986 in which state judges relied on their state guarantees to afford
greater protection than was available under the federal Bill of Rights
or the Fourteenth Amendment.6 0 This contrasts with only ten such
57 William J. Brennan, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 29, 1986, at S-1.
58 Justice Brennan's major contribution was his widely cited article, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977).
59 On school finance, see Russell S. Harrison & G. Alan Tarr, School Finance and
Inequality in New Jersey, in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY
CONTROVERSIES AND HIsrOIcAL PAT=ERNS 178, 178-201 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996). On
the rights of defendants, see BARRY LATZER, STATE CONsTIuTrIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSOn the right to privacy, see Mary Cornelia Porter & Robyn Mary O'Neill,
PersonalAutonomy and the Limits of State Authority, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES,
supra note 3, at 73-96. For an overview of state rulings, see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS,
TICE (1991).

STATE CONSTrTnTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

(2d ed. 1993).

60 Ronald K.L. Collins & PeterJ. Galie, Models of Post-IncorporationJudicialReview:
1985 Survey of State ConstitutionalIndividual Rights Decisions, PUBLIUs: J. FEDERALISM,
Summer 1986, at 111.
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cases from 1950 to 1969.61 Moreover, most of the rulings dated from
1977 onward, indicating an increasing propensity to rely on state guarantees. This coincides with the perception of state judges. A 1985
survey of state high court judges found that over seventy-five percent
believed that litigants were raising state constitutional arguments
more frequently than they had in the past, and twenty-five percent of
the surveyed judges believed that the change was substantial. 6 2 The
annual surveys of state constitutional cases in Rutgers Law Journalfurnish more evidence of reliance on state guarantees. During 1990, for
example, state supreme courts decided over 140 civil liberties cases
based either exclusively on state protections of rights or on a combination of federal and state protections. 63 Yet despite these data, some
recent studies have concluded that the new judicial federalism has
had a rather limited impact on civil liberties litigation in state courts
and on the development of constitutional law.
B.

The Frequency of State ConstitutionalChallenges

One indicator of the impact of the new judicial federalism is the
frequency of challenges to state laws on state constitutional grounds,
in lieu of-or, at a minimum, in conjunction with-federal constitutional challenges. Attorneys can be expected to raise state constitutional arguments only if they believe that judges will respond
sympathetically to them; so the frequency with which they raise such
arguments suggests the extent to which state courts have become attuned to the new judicial federalism. In addition, most courts refuse
to decide cases on the basis of legal arguments not briefed by the parties; indeed, most state supreme courts do not allow counsel to raise
64
state constitutional issues if they were not argued in the lower court
Therefore, state constitutional arguments are a prerequisite for decisions based on state declarations of rights.
To determine how frequently state constitutional claims are advanced, Craig Emmert and Carol Traut examined all state and federal
constitutional challenges to state laws coming before state supreme
courts from 1981 to 1985.65 In only twenty-two percent of the cases

did litigants challenge statutes solely on state constitutional grounds.
Such challenges were particularly rare when there were analogous
61 Id. at 146 tbl.1.
62 Id. tbl.3.
63

Developments in State ConstitutionalLaw: 1992, 22 RUTGERS LJ. 1105 (1993).

64 Collins et al., supra note 6, at 155 tbl.7.
65 Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions,
andJudicialPoliymaking, 16 JusT. Sys. J. 37 (1992).
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state and federal provisions, as is typically true in civil liberties litigation. 6 6 In fact, most state-constitution-only cases involved non-civil liberties issues, such as restrictions on special legislation, spending and
debt limitations, and the like. In over half the civil liberties cases, litigants challenged state laws exclusively on the basis of the federal Constitution. 67 In less than seventeen percent of those cases did they
challenge state laws exclusively on state constitutional grounds.
C.

The Bases forJudicialDecisions

Proponents of the new judicial federalism estimate that state
judges have announced over seven hundred rulings invalidating state
statutes based on state declarations of rights. In order to assess the
impact of the new judicial federalism, however, it is necessary to put
that figure in perspective, to consider in what proportion of constitutional cases state courts based their rulings on state guarantees. Eminert and Traut have reported that most criminal justice and bill of
rights cases involving analogous state and federal provisions are resolved exclusively on the basis of federal law, in part because litigants
relied on state law infrequently. In only eighteen percent of criminal
cases were claims based exclusively on state law, and in only twenty
percent on a combination of state and federal law. In bill of rights
cases, a similar pattern emerged: litigants brought claims based exclusively on state law in only fourteen percent of the cases and on a com68
bination of state and federal law in only nineteen percent.
Decisions based on state constitutions thus constituted a rather small
proportion of all civil liberties rulings from 1981 to 1985.
Other studies, focusing on instances when state courts had an opportunity to rely on either federal or state guarantees, report similar
findings. In a study of all rulings by six state supreme courts in 1975,
Susan Fino found that only seventeen percent of all cases that raised
constitutional issues were resolved on the basis of state law. 69 In a

later study of all equal protection cases decided by state supreme
courts from 1975 to 1984, she found that less than seven percent
rested exclusively on state guarantees. 70 In areas of considerable constitutional controversy, such as racial discrimination and criminal jusId. at 42 tbl.1, 46 tbl.3. Unless otherwise indicated, other figures in this paraare drawn from the same article.
Id. at 44 tbl.2 (computed from "criminal rights" and "bill of rights" cases).
Id.
SUSAN P. FINO, THE ROLE OF SrATE SUPREME COURTS IN THE NEWJUDICIAL FEDERALISM 142 (1987).
70 Susan P. Fino, JudicialFederalism and Equality Guaranteesin State Supreme Courts,
PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Winter 1987, at 33.
66
graph
67
68
69
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tice, state courts overwhelmingly relied on federal doctrine and
federal law. Only in areas of traditional state concern-such as bar
regulation cases, Sunday closing cases, inheritance cases, and the
like-did state high courts recur with any regularity to state equal protection guarantees. These cases seldom involved important civil liberties issues.
The findings of a more recent study, which examined all state
ruling in self-incrimination cases from 1981 to 1986, are similar. 7 1 Because the federal government and almost all states provide constitutional protection against self-incrimination, state judges deciding selfincrimination cases could presumably base their rulings on either
state or federal grounds. In seventy-eight percent of the cases, however, state judges based their rulings exclusively on federal law. Only
eight state supreme courts decided more than half their self-incrimination cases on state grounds, while fourteen states did not base any
of their decisions on state law.
Finally, Emmert and Traut found that when both federal and
state constitutional arguments were advanced by counsel, state courts
that invalidated state laws usually rested their rulings on both federal
and state grounds.7 2 However, it is difficult to know how to interpret
this finding. One cannot know whether state judges gave serious consideration to the state provision or merely mentioned it as an afterthought, while focusing their analysis on federal law and federal
3
precedent2
In summary, by examining not only how often state judges rely on
state declarations of rights but also how often they could have done so
but failed to do so, these commentators have concluded that the new
judicial federalism has had a rather limited effect on state supreme
courts' resolution of civil liberties cases.
D.

GreaterProtectionfor Rights?

Justice Brennan assumed that reliance on state declarations of
rights would result in greater protection for rights than is available
71 Michael Esler, State Supreme Court Commitment to State Law, 78 JuDicATURE 25
(1994).
72 Emmert & Traut, supra note 65, at 42.
73 Indeed, the frequent failure of state courts to clarify whether their rulings
rested on adequate and independent state grounds led the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), to require "clear statements" of the grounds
for state judicial rulings. However, there is little indication that the Court has induced greater clarity in state courts' rulings. See Felicia A. Rosenfield, Note, Fulfilling
the Coals of Michigan v. Long: The State Court Reaction, 56 FoRDH1m L. REv. 1041
(1988).
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under the federal Constitution. However, reliance on state grounds
to decide cases does not necessarily translate into more rights-affirming decisions. Some state guarantees may afford less protection
than the federal Constitution (although litigants would, in such circumstances, still enjoy the rights guaranteed by the federal provision) .74 More important, state judges may base their rulings on state
constitutional provisions but interpret them as affording no greater
protection than do the analogous federal guarantees. Although proponents of the new judicial federalism have decried the tendency toward "lockstep analysis," it is hardly surprising that state judges take
account of pertinent federal precedents in interpreting analogous
state provisions and at times conform their interpretations to federal
precedent. 75
Barry Latzer's comprehensive study of rulings in newjudicial federalism cases confirms the tendency toward lockstep analysis.76 Latzer
examined all state supreme court rulings in criminal procedure cases
from the late 1960s to 1989 that were decided on the basis of state
constitutions. He found that state judges routinely incorporated U.S.
Supreme Court doctrines into state constitutional law; indeed, they
adopted the Court's reasoning in over two-thirds of their criminal procedure decisions. 77 Some of the states that were most willing to base
their rulings on state constitutional guarantees, such as Connecticut
and New Hampshire, were also among those most willing to endorse
U.S. Supreme Court doctrine. 78 Meanwhile, Florida and California,
two states that had actively rejected Supreme Court doctrine, were
"brought into line" during the 1980s by constitutional amendments
that compelled conformity with federal law and, thereafter, substantially reduced their opposition. Based on these findings, Latzer concluded that there was a "hidden conservatism" in the new judicial
federalism because state judges--instead of independently developing
new state civil liberties law-tended to construe state and federal guarantees identically.
74 See, e.g., Sema v. Superior Court, 707 P.2d 793 (Cal. 1985); State v. Smith, 724
P.2d 894 (Or. 1986); State v. Hopper, 822 P.2d 775 (Wash. 1992).
75 On the undesirability of lockstep analysis, see Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme
Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Court Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result,
35 S.C. L. REv. 353 (1984). For a defense of lockstep analysis, see Earl M. Maltz,
Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism,496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 98
(1988).
76 LATZER, supra note 59.
77 Id. at 160-61 tbl.1. Unless otherwise indicated, data in this paragraph are
drawn from that table.
78 Id. at 165.
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More impressionistic studies support Latzer's conclusion. Several
studies have noted the failure of most state courts to develop a
broader protection for speech and press than is available under the
federal Constitution.7 9 Similarly, a study of state rulings in both
speech and religion cases concluded that they "continued to reflect
the assumption that consideration of these issues should begin and, in
most instances, end with federal precedent."80 Even in construing
their own constitutions, state courts characteristically relied on federal
precedent and doctrine in interpreting the state provisions.
V.

CONCLUSION

When state judges turned to their state declarations of rights in
the early 1970s, they were not recovering a tradition but creating one.
Their unfamiliarity with state guarantees, the absence of a state constitutional jurisprudence, the easy availability of federal doctrine and
precedent, and qualms about the legitimacy of judicial activism all
worked against the development of state civil liberties law. Yet, with
the intermittent encouragement of the U.S. Supreme Court and the
example of a few pioneering state courts, state judges began to rely
81
more frequently on state declarations of rights in deciding cases.
In most states, however, this recurrence to state guarantees has
remained intermittent. Most judges have not adopted the state-lawfirst approach championed by Hans Linde nor, typically, any principled basis for deciding when or whether to address state constitutional
claims. 82 There is no indication that this will change soon. For most
state supreme courts, federal constitutional law will remain the primary proteciion for rights and the primary source of constitutional
doctrine. Occasional recurrence to state provisions, in turn, will make
it difficult for these courts to develop a coherent body of state civil
liberties law.
79 See Sue Davis & Taunya Lovell Banks, State Constitutions,Freedom ofExpression,
and Search and Seizure: Prospectsfor State Court Reincarnation, PUBLIUs: J. FEDERALISM,
Winter 1987, at 13; Todd F. Simon, Independent but Inadequate: State Constitutionsand
Protection ofFreedom ofExpression, 33 U. KAN. L. REv. 305 (1985).

80 Tarr, supra note 8, at 39.
'81 For examples of encouragement, see PruneYardShopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74 (1980); and Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). For less encouraging signals, see
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); and Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032

(1983).
82 The "state-law-first" approach is advocated in Linde, supra note 7. The main
principled alternative is a "criteria" approach under which judges would rely on state
guarantees only when certain criteria were met. For a discussion of the criteria approach, see WuLLAMS, supra note 59, at 316-29.
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This is not to deny the importance of the new judicial federalism.
Quantitative analyses may indicate that state judges often do not rely
on state guarantees in civil liberties cases. However, while counting all
cases equally may be necessary for quantitative analyses, it obscures
the major impact of some state judicial initiatives. Among these are
state constitutional rulings involving education and exclusionary zoning, rulings which occurred in part because of the U.S. Supreme
Court's refusal to grant relief and which would have been impossible
without the new judicial federalism.8 3 Moreover, even intermittent reliance on state guarantees represents a major shift in state judicial
practice, and the reinvigoration of apparently obsolescent state constitutional provisions is itself a noteworthy development. Finally, the
new judicial federalism has helped to spark a renewed interest in state
constitutions, indicated most strikingly by campaigns to amend the
constitutions either to extend or to curtail rights.
Ultimately, the newjudicial federalism will most likely disappoint
both its proponents and detractors. Most state judges will not embrace the state-law-first approach, thereby foregoing the discretion to
choose between constitutional guarantees. Nor will state declarations
of rights replace the federal Bill of Rights as the primary protection
for individual rights. Nevertheless, having had the experience of interpreting state guarantees and having seen the creation of a body of
precedent on which they can draw, neither are state judges likely to
return to the second era's neglect of state protections or thoughtlessly
assume that federal and state guarantees offer equivalent protection.
Although they may learn from the rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court,
they will not slavishly imitate them. Moreover, at times the justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court may learn from the initiatives of their sister
courts in the "laboratories" of the states. The new judicial federalism
may be new no longer, but there is reason to believe that it will not
soon disappear.

83 The pertinent Supreme Court rulings are, on education, San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); and, on exclusionary zoning, Warth v. Seldi,
422 U.S. 490 (1975). For discussion of the state rulings and their effects, see G. ALAN
TARR, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING ch. 11 (1994); G. Alan Tarr &
Russell S. Harrison, Legitimacy and Capacity in State Supreme Court Poliymaking: The New
Jersey Supreme Court andExclusionary Zoning, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 514; and Harrison & Tarr,
supra note 59.

